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Abstract
An explicit formal-ontological representation of entities existing at multiple levels
of granularity is an urgent requirement for biomedical information processing. We
discuss some fundamental principles which can form a basis for such a representation.
We also comment on some of the implicit treatments of granularity in currently
available ontologies and terminologies (GO, FMA, SNOMED CT). Copyright  2004
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Organisms, including human beings, consist of a
variety of anatomical structures which exist at
different levels of granularity (also called ‘lev-
els of complexity’ or ‘levels of biological orga-
nization’). Analogous levels of granularity can be
distinguished also on the side of the processes
and functions which the given anatomical struc-
tures exercise. Medical practitioners and medical
informaticians are primarily interested in structures,
functions and processes at the coarser levels of
granularity; theoretical biologists and bioinformati-
cians in those at the ﬁner levels of granularity.
We believe that in bridging the gap between the
two groups of disciplines, an important role can be
played by a theory of granular levels. Such a the-
ory would be able to do justice, for example, to
the fact that, even though our skin loses hundreds
of thousands of cells per day, it still, at a coarser
level of granularity, remains intact as an anatom-
ical entity. It would also enable us to do justice
to the fact that compounds like carcinoembryonic
antigens serve as markers for colon carcinoma, or
to the fact that methotrexate acts upon individual
cancer cells to produce effects at the organ level.
In the daily practice of a physician, such molecu-
lar interactions are not of central importance; for
the biologist, however, it is precisely phenomena
at such ﬁner levels of granularity which are of
principal interest. If the effective integration of life-
science data is to be achieved, then we need to do
justice within a single framework to all the differ-
ent disciplines involved, and this means also to the
associated levels of granularity.
It is not only different disciplines but also dif-
ferent terminology, ontology and database systems
that deal with entities at different levels of granular-
ity. But there are notorious incompatibilities both
within and across such systems, and in what fol-
lows we will provide some examples designed to
show how a rigorous theory of granularity can be
of use in helping to eliminate some of those incom-
patibilities.
Levels of granularity in anatomy
Preliminary observations
We shall deal here with those anatomical levels
of granularity which are ranged between the level
of the single biological macromolecule and of the
whole organism. There are lower (submolecular)
levels of granularity and also levels existing above
the organism (such as populations and species), but
we do not consider these here. Also, not all the
Copyright  2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.502 A. Kumar, B. Smith and D. D. Novotny
levels of granularity here discussed exist within
every species. For the sake of simplicity, we focus
here only on human beings.
We start with some basic principles, which we
believe can serve as axioms of a full-ﬂedged
theory of granularity. These basic principles are
formulated ﬁrst in an unrestricted form. Later we
shall see different ways in which they need to
be modiﬁed to deal with certain special cases
(for details on a more general framework for
granularity, see Bittner and Smith, 2002):
1. Each level of granularity is determined by a
class or type of grain.
2. The grains in a given level are parts of the grains
in the next higher level.
3. Every level of granularity is such that summing
all the grains together yields the entire human
body.
4. The grains in a given level do not need to be
all of the same size, neither do they need to be
homogeneous.
5. The grains in a given level must be smaller in
size than those entities on the next higher level
of which they are parts.
6. With each level of granularity there is associated
some speciﬁc type of causal understanding and
thus some speciﬁc family of causal laws; when
one moves up a level, then the grains on the
lower levels become causally irrelevant.
7. Some entities can change through time in such
a way that one and the same entity (an embryo,
a tumour, an organism) can occupy a sequence
of different levels of granularity in succession.
From principles 4 and 5, it follows that size is
a criterion for drawing dividing lines between
granular levels. This criterion, however, cannot be
applied indiscriminately to all the entities on a
given level; rather, it must be applied to each entity
or group of entities in succession. For each speciﬁc
entity, it holds that it is smaller in size than the
grain in which it is included as part in the next
higher level and larger in size than the (typically
many) grains it will include as parts in the next
level down.
Preliminary identiﬁcation of granular levels
Principle 1 tells us that each level of granularity is
determined by a class of grains of a certain sort.
It is, however, not a trivial task to determine what
are the classes of grains from which the human
body is built and to ﬁgure out what principles
and conditions such grains must satisfy. Must
all grains be maximally self-connected relative to
some condition, such as being made up of cells or
molecules of the same type? The example of the
endocrine system tells us that it will be difﬁcult
to hold onto this principle if we allow organ
systems as grains forming a level of granularity of
their own (Smith et al., 2004). Here, we put such
questions aside and simply suggest that there are
the following more or less well-deﬁned levels of
granularity within the human organism (the section
that follows, however, can be also taken as a
preliminary justiﬁcation of our list):
1. Organism, e.g. human body taken as a whole.
2. Organ system, e.g. respiratory system, diges-
tive system.
3. Cardinal body part, e.g. head, thorax,
abdomen.
4. Organ, e.g. liver, lung, kidney.
5. Organ part, e.g. upper lobe of lung, renal
pelvis.
6. Tissue, e.g. pulmonary alveolar epithelium,
mesothelium of pleura.
7. Tissue subdivision, e.g. anterior epithelium of
iris.
8. Collection of cells, e.g. portion of menstrual
secretion.
9. Cell, e.g. neuron, nephron, white blood cell.
10. Collection of subcellular organelles, e.g. rough
endoplasmic reticulum, ﬂagellar structure.
11. Subcellular organelle, e.g. nucleus, ribosome.
12. Biological macromolecule, e.g. protein, poly-
saccharide.
Granularity and the mass/count
distinction
In order to decide on which levels of granularity
there are we must consider the distinction between
count nouns such as ‘cow’, ‘suitcase’, ‘chair’, and
mass nouns such as ‘beef’, ‘luggage’, ‘furniture’
(Pelletier 1991). Count nouns are nouns referring to
entities — grains — that can be counted. A normal
human body has two lungs, one liver, millions
of cells. Mass nouns are those nouns which refer
to stuff, such as blood or urine, conceived in a
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way that traces over its granular constituents. One
cannot count blood or urine, although one can
count portions of blood or urine, including the
maximal portions of these substances which exist
in given containers at given times. (To speak of
‘three waters’ or ‘four bloods’ is a clumsy way
of referring to types of water or blood; but types
are precisely not parts of any particular human
organism.)
Within a human body, there is at every given
time one maximal portion of hepatic tissue, which
is the combination of all the portions of hepatic
tissue within the body at that time. Within standard
anatomy, however, the mass/count distinction is not
fully respected, above all as concerns the use of
the words ‘substance’ and ‘tissue’. We shall here
circumvent this problem by taking tissue-terms as
count-nouns referring to portions of tissue. Such
portions of tissue belong in each case to speciﬁc
organ parts, e.g. the maximal portions of epithelial
tissue of the liver are proper parts of the hepatic
lobules.
On each level of granularity the grains are
marked by their own characteristic kinds of struc-
ture. Organs, cells, molecules have such character-
istic structures, and so do portions of tissue and
collections of subcellular organelles. Each separate
portion of hepatic tissue is in a certain sense a
lump, yet it has well-deﬁned hexagonal lobules.
Similarly, each portion of muscular tissue has fas-
cicles and motor units. Our levels of granularity
are now selected by paying attention to the factor
of having grains, each in such a way as to satisfy
grain-speciﬁc causal principles.
The different biomedical disciplines then lend
different degrees of importance to the structures
and causal powers of entities within different
levels of granularity. Thus, while for biologists
and bioinformaticians portions of tissue are in the
majority of cases the coarsest structures with which
they have to deal, for medical practitioners and
medical informaticians the structures of primary
interest go all the way up to the organ and organism
levels of granularity.
Further conﬁrmation of our proposed list of
levels comes from the existing life-science disci-
plinary divisions both within medicine and between
medicine and other disciplines, such as molecular
biology, genetics, pharmacology, and so on.
Granularity and parthood
Two levels of granularity in our list involve grains
which overlap in the mereological sense of sharing
common parts, implying the failure of unrestricted
principles 2 and 5: the levels of cardinal body parts
and of organ systems. Thus, part of the respiratory
system is in the head, another part is within the
chest. The two levels in question reﬂect partitions
of the body which are skew to each other. The
head, however, is listed as a grain on the level of
granularity of cardinal body parts.
Apart from this example, however, the entities at
the ﬁner levels of granularity here considered are
always parts of corresponding entities belonging
to coarser levels of granularity, just as entities at
coarser levels are associated always with entities
belonging at ﬁner levels as their parts. We represent
the issue formally as follows:
Let GRAN =  G1,G2,G3 ....G12  be the set of
levels of granularity as established along the lines
indicated above, ordered from coarsest to ﬁnest,
and let U be the set of biological universals (e.g.
those deﬁned in GO or FMA). We deﬁne gr as the
function of U onto GRAN. This function associates
each universal with its level of granularity:
gr:u→gr(u), for u ∈ U and gr(u) ∈ GRAN
Notice that for the sake of simplicity we do not
take time into consideration. This, however, will
be necessary when we come to deal with entities
which change their level of granularity according
to their stage of development. Thus, for instance,
a tumour or a human being starts as a cell or a
collection of cells and gradually grows to occupy
successively coarser levels of granularity.
We write ‘inst(x,u)’ for ‘x is an instance of
u’, where x ranges over particulars and u over
universals. We write ‘part(x,y)’, for ‘x is a part
of y’, where x and y range over particulars. ‘∃’i s
the standard existential quantiﬁer of predicate logic,
and means ‘there is some/there is at least one’. This
enables us to assert, for example, that:
∃xinst(x,mitochondrion)
& ∃yinst(y, hepatocyte) & part(x,y)
& gr(x) = G11(Subcellular Organelle)
& gr(y) = G9 (Cell)
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This means that there is some instance of mito-
chondrion at the subcellular organelle level of gran-
ularity which is a part of an instance of hepato-
cyte at the cell level. We should like, however,
to assert statements to the effect that all entities
of a given type at one level of granularity stand
in a given relation to entities of some other given
type at some other level of granularity. Unfortu-
nately, not every instance of mitochondrion is a
part of some instance of hepatocyte, since mito-
chondria are present in almost all human cells. We
can, however, deﬁne a class consisting of all and
only those mitochondria which are present within
hepatocytes and call this class ‘hepatocyte mito-
chondrion’. Using ‘∀’ as the standard universal
quantiﬁer (meaning: for all/given any), we could
then write:
∀xinst(x,hepatocyte mitochondrion) →
∃yinst(y,hepatocyte) & part(x,y) & gr(x) = G11
(Subcellular Organelle) & gr(y) = G9 (Cell)
∀xinst(x,hepatocyte) →∃ yinst(y,hepatocyte
mitochondrion) & part(y,x) & gr(x) = G9
(Cell) & gr(y) = G11 (Subcellular Organelle)
This, however, is not an ideal solution as we move
down the granular hierarchy. Thus, if we wish
to refer, for instance, to the lipopolysaccharides
present within the mitochondrial membrane present
within hepatocytes, then the corresponding class
would need to be called hepatocyte mitochondrion
membrane lipopolysaccharides, and this expression
is marked by an obvious ambiguity. We could
remove the threat of ambiguity here by introducing
special operators, such as ‘*’, to pick out just those
instances of a given universal which are parts of
another universal. Thus, while not all mitochondria
are parts of hepatocytes, we do have, trivially:
hepatocyte ∗ mitochondrion part of hepatocyte
where hepatocyte ∗ mitochondrion is that class
whose instances consist of those mitochondria
which are parts of hepatocytes (for an alternative
approach, see Smith and Rosse, 2004).
Instances at coarser levels of granularity have
instances at ﬁner levels of granularity as parts, and
instances at ﬁner levels are parts of instances at
coarser levels. We can state these principles as
follows:
∀x∀uinst(x,u) & gr(u) = Gn &n > 1 →
∃y∃vinst(y,v) & gr(v) = Gn−1 & part(x,y)
which means that for each instance of each uni-
versal existing at a level of granularity lower than
the highest level, there is an instance of a universal
at some higher (coarser) level of which the given
instance is a part. The converse, where we set Gk
to be the lowest level of granularity, is also true:
∀x∀uinst(x,u) & gr(u) = Gn &n< k →
∃y∃vinst(y,v) & gr(v) = Gn+1 & part(y,x)
For each instance of a universal at some level of
granularity higher than the lowest level, there is an
instance of a universal at some lower (ﬁner) level
that is a part thereof.
Granularity and the Gene Ontology
The Gene Ontology (GO website; for a criti-
cal overview see Smith et al., 2003) consists of
three orthogonal axes, pertaining to cellular com-
ponents, molecular functions and biological pro-
cesses, respectively. GO’s cellular component axis,
which is the counterpart of anatomy in other bio-
logical ontologies, comprehends the universal cell
at its highest level of granularity. There is, how-
ever, a further, more fragmentary anatomy ontol-
ogy embedded within GO among the children of
development (in terms like fat body development
and so forth). Molecular functions are deﬁned by
GO as ‘the (actual or potential) biochemical activ-
ity of a gene product’ (Gene Ontology Consortium
2000). Biological processes are ‘objective(s) to
which the gene or gene product contributes’ (ibid.).
Functions and processes are entities dependent
on certain other entities which are their bearers
(Husserl, 1900–1901; Simons, 1987). Since the
independent entities recognized by GO terms in
their own right have cell as their highest granu-
larity, any biological process which occurs at gran-
ularities coarser than this is unable to receive an
adequate representation within the GO framework,
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since we have no way of referring to the indepen-
dent entity which is its bearer.
It is clear that biological processes such as
behaviour, response to extracellular stimulus, sex
determination, etc., have component processes at
the cellular level. However, they also have com-
ponent processes e.g. at the organ or body system
levels, and GO again lacks the means for represent-
ing these. This is not a criticism of GO: it reﬂects
a design choice, taken by the original authors of
GO, with its own pragmatic motivations. However,
it does draw attention to the need to embed GO
within a larger framework within which this built-
in expressive paucity can be surmounted.
Another feature of the terms in the Gene Ontol-
ogy related to the phenomenon of granularity is the
deﬁnition of GO’s extracellular. This term in GO’s
cellular component ontology is deﬁned as meaning
the space external to the outermost structure of a
cell. Since no external limit is set for this exter-
nal space, it could in principle extend to include
all the space within the human body that is not
inside a given cell. This problem could be avoided
by taking the relevant size of spatial regions to
be determined by the grains (i.e. by cells, in this
example) associated with each of GO’s constituent
ontologies.
In general, GO does not provide links between
its three axes, although efforts are under way to
ﬁll in this gap and GO may introduce such links at
some time in the future. Within the current version,
however, the relationships are not represented,
which leads to the problems indicated above.
In approaching the problem of establishing links
between GO’s three axes, we have encountered
problems especially where biological processes
needed to be linked to cellular components. This
is because too many cellular component terms
are picked out by automatic and semi-automatic
methods as eligible bearers of biological processes
such as growth, metabolism, homeostasis, and so
forth. The need to solve this problem is one of the
many reasons why projects like GO should address
issues of granularity in more detail and with more
precision in order to enable the ﬁne-tuning of such
methods.
With the exceptions of sensu-terms, such as
‘cytosolic ribosome (sensu Bacteria)’, GO terms
are designed to apply across all species. This, too,
reﬂects a deliberate design choice, motivated by
the desire to serve the cross-species annotation of
genes and gene products. It has the disadvantage,
however, that it becomes difﬁcult to understand
the meaning behind those GO terms like adult
behavior, which would paradigmatically refer to
human beings, but which could also, for example,
refer to unicellular organisms when applied to
entities at the cellular level of granularity.
One way to get round this problem is to take into
account the existing species-speciﬁc annotations
of gene products to terms in GO’s three axes.
Thus, just as we can create extra-ontological links
between terms in GO’s three separate axes by
looking at the ways in which such terms are used
in annotations of the same genes or gene products,
so we could use the ways in which ambiguous
terms are used in annotations to species at different
levels of granularity in order to ensure univocal
interpretations.
Granularity and the Foundational Model
of Anatomy
The Foundational Model of Anatomy (FMA)
(FMA website; Mejino et al., 2003; Rosse and
Mejino, 2003; Smith and Rosse, 2004) compre-
hends all but two of the levels of granularity
mentioned in our list above. The exceptions are:
collection of cells and collection of subcellular
organelles. Levels of granularity are not included
in the FMA as such. Rather, each is represented by
a speciﬁc anatomical universal, so that the univer-
sals belonging to each level stand in a subsumption
relationship to the universal marking the level in
question.
To treat granularity in terms of subsumption in
this way is once again a simple design choice. One
disadvantage of the approach, however, is that the
ontological zooming between levels of granularity,
e.g. of the sort which occurs when we move from
viewing a tumour in terms of molecular structures
to viewing it in terms of cellular structures, can
be more easily captured by software tools when
the levels of granularity are explicitly distinguished
(Bittner and Smith, 2002). The relations which
obtain between entities belonging to different levels
of granularity, e.g. the cross-granular parthood rela-
tion between superﬁcial layer of corneal epithelium
(or deep layer of corneal epithelium) and corneal
epithelium, are not always explicitly represented as
such within the FMA.
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Granularity and SNOMED CT
SNOMED CT (SNOMED CT website) includes
the class anatomical structure, which subsumes in
its turn subclasses corresponding to what we have
been here calling levels of granularity, and they
cover some of the levels of granularity in this
way. Unfortunately, the SNOMED children of the
class anatomical structure are not pairwise disjoint.
Anatomical structure in SNOMED is classiﬁed as
a physical anatomical entity and its subclasses
include developmental body structure, intercellular
anatomical structure, entire anatomical structure,
transplant, structure of product of conception, body
region structure, sex structure, body system struc-
ture, body tissue structure, body organ structure,
body wall structure and cell structure.
Sex structure, structure of product of conception,
transplant and developmental body structure over-
lap with body organ structure and body tissue struc-
ture and, indeed, with each other, in a way which
should be avoided in a robust ontology.
The price of neglecting levels
of granularity
Some of the problems which occur when we
neglect levels of granularity are as follows:
1. The treatment of anatomical entities as entities
which maintain their identity through time is
hampered. Data integration hitherto has been
constrained to work with data in which attributes
are assigned primarily to entities at some one
speciﬁc level of granularity. Stronger data inte-
gration frameworks can be constructed if we
have explicit tools for keeping track of enti-
ties and their attributes as they traverse different
levels.
2. An explicit representation along the lines pre-
sented above would enable us to do justice to
the fact that, for example, cellular development
is different from development of lungs, even if
both are types of development.
3. Some representation of granularity is needed
also to represent the fact that, for example, the
infection of only one cell within the lung is not
pneumonia.
4. If one cell in the colon epithelium has a p53
mutation, then since the cell is a part of the
colon and since the p53 mutation is associated
with colon carcinoma, a computer could falsely
infer that colon carcinoma exists. Similarly, a
haemorrhage in one pulmonary arteriole can be
without any systemic effects. Thus, we need to
distinguish this case from the case of a haemor-
rhage of the lung. Without some representation
of levels of granularity, however, a haemorrhage
involving one full lobe of the lung would not be
distinguishable from a haemorrhage involving
only one arteriole. Similarly, the loss of even
hundreds of thousands of cells from the mucosa
of the gastrointestinal tract should not lead to the
inference of a generalized ulcer of the tract, and
the death of hundreds of cells within the uterine
epithelium should not lead to the inference of
uterine necrosis.
5. Terms such as ‘development’ need to be used
in such a way that we can distinguish formally
between, for example, development in a uni-
cellular bacterium and development of social
behaviour in human beings.
6. Some cells within the heart might secrete
endocrinal products. This would not, however,
make the heart an endocrine organ.
Granularity of functions and processes
It is not a trivial exercise to represent granular
levels within anatomy. But representing such levels
within the dimensions of function and process is an
even more difﬁcult task. A function is something
like a potential to act in a certain way. Functions are
continuant entities, which means that they preserve
their identity through time from one realization to
the next (and also that they can exist even when
they are not being realized at all). The realizations
of functions are processes, e.g. of respiration. This
means then that such realizations are entities whose
instances occur through a period of time and are
not present in totality at any particular instant of
time. Processes can be segmented into temporal
parts (e.g. into a beginning, a middle, and an
end). Both functions and processes are dependent
entities, which means that they cannot exist without
being realized in or by some underlying continuant
bearer or bearers, e.g. a cell, an organelle, a human
being.
There are three ways to represent the granular-
ity of functions and processes: (a) on the basis
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of the granularity levels of their underlying bear-
ers; (b) on the basis of time, applying to processes
directly and to functions indirectly via their realiza-
tions — the analogue of size in the case of granu-
larity for anatomical entities; and (c) on the basis of
the parthood relations which exist between differ-
ent functions on the one hand or between different
processes on the other.
(a) From the anatomical perspective, cellular func-
tions are dependent on the cells which are their
bearers and thus exist at the cellular level of
granularity; organ functions are dependent on
the organs which are their bearers and thus exist
at the organ level of granularity.
(b) The temporal extent of a biological process can
be measured in years, months, weeks, days,
hours, minutes, seconds and so on. Processes,
including the realizations of functions, have
coarser or a ﬁner grain from the temporal
perspective according to whether they take a
longer or shorter time.
(c) The most involved perspective on granularity
for processes or functions conceives the lat-
ter in terms of chains of parthood relations
obtaining between the processes or functions
involved. Unfortunately, this method does not
yield a clear ordering of levels, since it is not
clear when processes do or do not stand to each
other in part relations. Does a process of res-
piration associated with a process of running
stand to the latter as part to whole? Is reg-
ulation of sleep a part of sleep? Is ageing a
part of dying? Moreover, not all instances of
a smaller process or function are parts of any
larger process or function, and not all instances
of a larger process or function have instances
of smaller processes or functions as parts.
For example, hexokinase 1 (KEGG K00844,
EC 2.7.1.1) activity is involved not only in
glycolysis but also in all of the following:
fructose and mannose metabolism, galactose
metabolism, starch and sucrose metabolism and
aminosugar metabolism. In such a case, we can
create terms such as:
hexokinase 1 activity involved in
glycolytic pathway
in order to represent those cases where hexokinase
1 activity is involved in glycolysis, or alternatively:
hexokinase 1 activity involved in
galactose metabolism pathway
in order to represent those instances where hex-
okinase 1 activity is involved in some galactose
metabolism pathway, and so on.
Only when we are able to represent the instances of
a function or a process which are parts of a larger
function or process, can we locate them within their
bearers, assign to them facilitators or inhibitors,
substrates or products and so on.
Conclusion
The fact that organisms are built out of structures
organized in a granular way has long been well
known to domain specialists. In this paper we have
embarked upon a preliminary investigation of the
phenomenon of granularity, identifying the main
issues, proposing some elements of an explicit for-
malism and commenting on the implicit ways in
which granularity has been represented in ontolo-
gies such as GO, FMA, SNOMED CT thus far.
We hope to have made clear that any good refer-
ence ontology of human (and non-human) organ-
isms needs to avail itself of tools for representing
granularity in an explicit way.
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